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Chapter 3 – A new era and new legislation  
 
The Copyright Debate in Britain, 1911–12 
A public debate 
For most of 1911, from Buxton’s introduction of the Copyright Bill on 
2 April until its passage through the Lords on 16 December, a dual 
debate occupied the pages of The Times, which followed the copyright 
controversies of that year attentively. By comparison, the pages of the 
Sydney Morning Herald in 1912 made few references to the Copyright Bill 
before the Commonwealth Parliament and the issues debated. The 
absence of correspondence on the subject in the Australian newspaper 
suggested that Australians, unlike interested Britons, felt little interest in 
the topic of copyright. The pattern recurred in 1956, when Britain 
passed a new Copyright Act, and 1968, when Australia followed suit: 
substantive debate in Britain and minimal interest in Australia.  
It would be a mistake to infer Australian intellectual apathy from these 
comparisons. What they reveal is the economic relevance to both 
countries of copyright regulation. Britain, in 1911, was the home of a 
nascent film industry, a powerful phonographic industry, the 
forerunner of today’s music industry, and a highly developed publishing 
industry. The latter two industries had already established the 
characteristics that distinguish their modern counterparts: 
comparatively low fixed costs, high revenues and high variable profits 
affected by changes in taste. Selling to the public, they deliberately 
addressed their political arguments to a public audience. 
Australia, lacking Britain’s resources of population, technology and 
historical memory could not hope to create an economically productive 
culture of creative endeavour on the British scale. Australia played a 
pioneering role in the early development of cinema but it imported, 
rather than produced, most of its copyright product. In 1912 and 1968, 
when Parliament adopted new copyright statutes, the Australian press 
rarely broke its silence on matters of copyright policy. Unfortunately, 
indifference caused blindness, and Australians failed to see how 
imperial rules sometimes caused harm to the interests of the Australian 
public. For instance, Australians paid high prices for imported books 
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but few protested against the import controls that allowed British 
publishers to maintain high prices.1  
The political background and focus of debate 
On 26 July 1910, two months after the Imperial Copyright Conference 
ended, Sydney Buxton introduced in the Commons a copyright bill 
giving effect to the recommendations of the Conference and Gorell 
Committee. The bill arrived in the middle of ferocious political warfare 
over the Government’s attempts to curb the powers of the House of 
Lords. Dissolution and a General Election in December stymied 
progress and copyright advocates waited impatiently for several months 
before the bill returned to the legislative program.  
The Government revived the bill in April 1911, passing it to Standing 
Committee A, a cross-party “Grand Committee”, for consideration and 
report. The Grand Committee sat 13 times between the middle of April 
and 13 July, in which time the bill underwent, as The Times reported on 
14 July, “a considerable transformation”. Departing from the 
recommendation of the Gorrell Committee, the Committee proposed 
provisions allowing for the compulsory licensing of recordings. The 
modified bill passed to the Lords in November.  
Despite the internecine bitterness poisoning political life in 1911 – the 
Lords lost their power to veto Commons’ bills after two years of 
bloodcurdling political struggle – the Copyright Bill escaped the 
partisanship that earlier derailed the Government’s social reform 
measures, and now sabotaged the Home Rule Bill. The reason for the 
absence of controversy is not hard to find – all parties could agree on 
the excellence of introducing new property rights. Their support for a 
bill of property illustrated, with blinding clarity, the politicians’ attitude 
to copyright regulation. So long as it could be said to reasonably satisfy 
the economic needs of the competing interest groups, they were not 
disturbed by the generous apportioning of possessory entitlements.  
Britain, home to booming recording, film and publishing industries, did 
not resist the extension of authors’ rights and the conferral of rights on 
                                                     
1 Apathy did not always rule. The Librarian of Fisher Library at Sydney University, 
Andrew D Osborn, wrote to the Copyright Law Review Committee (the Spicer 
Committee) on 14 October 1959 to protest restrictions on the import of books. He 
noted that in his opening address to the University he declared that “the situation 
in the booktrade and in Australian cultural life was so serious that a Royal 
Commission was necessary at the present juncture.” 
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industries. But public acquiescence did not mean indifference. The 
Times, for instance, followed matters of copyright policy with keen 
interest in 1911, as it did in 1956, when a new Act replaced the old. The 
public debate in Britain, recorded in the pages of The Times, 
concentrated on the claims of the phonographic industry, and the 
grievances of the publishers, an emphasis that confirmed the 
politicians’ shift towards satisfying the needs of producers. George 
Bernard Shaw, who in May 1911 carried out a brief and amusing 
correspondence in The Times with John Drummond Robertson of the 
Gramophone Company, summarised the position dramatically but not 
wholly inaccurately: 
An injustice has to be done either to us artists or to the manufacturers. We, being 
artists, are poor and politically insignificant. They, being industrialists, are rich and 
can bully Governments. I suppose we must go to the wall, but I do not see why we 
should do so without politely informing the public and the Government that we 
thoroughly understand what is happening to us, and that we submit to injustice 
because we cannot help ourselves, and not in the least because we are imposed upon 
by the special pleading of Mr Drummond Robertson and those whom he represents. 
Put more starkly, copyright regulation divided the spoils of property 
between two groups, and one benefited the most at the expense of the 
other. But regulators neglected a third interest group – the public. As 
the Liberal MP, Frederick Booth, pointed out in May 1911, in “the 
bargaining between various interests” the “public are being lost sight 
of”. In November, Lord Courtney, an egalitarian Liberal peer born, 
incidentally, a year after Macaulay’s first great speech in favour of the 
Reform Bill, said the 50 year posthumous term was “going to sacrifice 
the whole reading public”. A handful of their Liberal colleagues also 
argued against the long posthumous term. Otherwise, both Houses 
wasted little time pondering the needs of those who bought books  
and records.  
Compulsory licence for musical works 
The Grand Committee had a nasty surprise in store for those who 
expected a smooth transition to the kind of Copyright Act envisaged by 
the Gorrell Committee and the Board of Trade. As amended, section 
19 of the bill conferred on record manufacturers copyright in records 
and authorised them to make recordings of any recorded work subject 
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to payment of a royalty.2 Perhaps because the Gorrell Committee 
endorsed the manufacturer’s copyright in records, possibly as a sop for 
rejecting arguments for the compulsory licence, the provision for 
manufacturers’ copyright met a muted response. Section 19(2), the 
compulsory licence provision, aroused, however, a furious reaction 
from musical composers and publishers. Their response is not 
surprising, since the Gorrell Committee dismissed the arguments for 
compulsory licensing in categorical terms, and the bill introduced by 
Buxton contained no provision for the licence.  
The fact that the Grand Committee added to the bill so contentious a 
clause, and few in the Commons or Lords opposed the innovation, 
illustrates how dramatically, in two years, the phonographic industry 
transformed thinking about the purpose of copyright regulation. 
Legislators still mouthed platitudes about authors’ rights, but they now 
recognised the economic consequences of recognising such rights in 
law. They, far more than the Gorrell Committee, a gathering of 
supporters of authors’ rights, saw the naivety of granting rights that, if 
unqualified, threatened the competitive existence of one of Britain’s 
newest and most powerful industries.  
The recording industry as a whole lobbied to change attitudes, but 
publicly at least, the indefatigable John Drummond Robertson, 
manager of the Gramophone Company, seems to have done the most 
to persuade policy makers of the intended function of compulsory 
licensing as a device to defeat manufacturing monopoly. Robertson 
destroyed the proposition that investment and risk ought to rank 
behind originality as the determinant of legal preferment. For the first 
time, politicians heard it said without equivocation that the 
manufacturer of a record had an equal or better claim to the benefits of 
copyright protection than the author of the recorded work. Robertson 
preached the heresy of equal entitlement to three audiences: the Gorrell 
Committee, which rejected his reasoning, the readers of The Times, in 
the pages of which he engaged in a lively controversy during May 1911, 
and the politicians of the Grand Committee.  
On every occasion that he entered into debate he did so by taking, 
figuratively, two steps forward. He refused to apologise for the alleged 
depredations of his industry, and instead painted the record companies 
                                                     
2 Section 19(3) provided that the royalty payable for each record sold in the first 
two years after commencement of the Act was 2.5 per cent and thereafter, 5 per 
cent. 
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as injured parties. According to Robertson, Boosey v Whight, the hated 
reminder of judicial witlessness, conferred a legal right on the recording 
industry, the right to copy. The industry had nothing to be ashamed of 
and reason for grievance. If the legislature proposed to take away a 
common law right, let it provide compensation.  
Arguments in The Times 
The merits and demerits of the proposed compulsory licence were 
illuminated in the letters page of The Times. The prominent men who 
took a public stand against statutory licensing were Sir Charles Stanford 
and William Wallace, famous composers and articulate advocates for 
their fellow musicians, William Boosey the proprietor of the venerable 
firm of music publishers Boosey and Co,3 and forthright defender of 
music publishers, and, not least, George Bernard Shaw. John 
Drummond Robertson opposed them unaided. 
Robertson staked his position in a letter to The Times on 2 May 1911:  
The reasonableness of the proposal is grounded in the fact that a new right and a 
large new source of profit [the mechanical rights] is being created for the author, to 
which he contributes nothing from the inventive and artistic side. His work is no 
more valuable because mechanical reproduction, one of the greatest wonders of the 
age, has been brought to a high state of perfection by the skill of the inventor and the 
ingenuity of the mechanician. 
Shaw and Boosey responded two days later. The latter concentrated on 
the extraordinary profits achieved by Robertson’s company when 
returns to composers were nil. The Gramophone Company’s profits 
amounted “during the last three years to the huge total of £358, 557 
17s 6d”. Furthermore, the Chairman had announced in 1908 “that for 
each £100 invested they [shareholders] had already received the sum of 
£168 in dividends.” Nor could it be said that the phonographic 
industry did not take revenues from music publishers. “Records for 
mechanical players are copies of a work,” said Boosey. “Abundant 
evidence was given before the Board of Trade Committee that the sale 
of sheet music had been enormously depreciated by the kindly 
advertising influence and sale of mechanical discs and rolls.”  
                                                     
3 Established by John Boosey in the 1760s and in William Boosey’s day the 
publisher of Elgar. Later the firm published Vaughan Williams.  
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Shaw emphasised that the indispensable role of the composer in the 
chain of production that led to the sale of a record justified the grant of 
the mechanical right to authors. 
The letter of Mr J. Drummond Robertson is unanswerable, not because it is 
convincing, but because its audacity paralyses all the nervous centres which make 
controversy possible. Our comfort is that, if it is brought forward and pushed to its 
logical conclusion in a speech in the House of Commons, that Assembly, if it has 
any conscience and any logic, will be stupefied beyond all power of passing the 
Copyright Bill or anything else for the remainder of the session. 
Shaw referred to the desperate circumstances of Richard Wagner. 
He was far past middle age before he was free of the most humiliating pecuniary 
anxieties. And now, if you please, the manufacturers who have made more money 
out of Wagner’s music than he ever spent in his whole life, and who never paid him 
a farthing, want his heirs to compensate them for the loss of their power to steal his 
music with impunity. 
Shaw attributed responsibility for the economic distress of composers 
not to the phonographic industry alone but society as well. “The 
community sinned,” he said, “and the community should atone.” 
Robertson responded a few days later “I had supposed that this subject 
was too dry for dramatic treatment: but Mr Bernard Shaw’s letter will 
have convinced your readers to the contrary, if it convinces them of 
nothing else.” Robertson pointed out that the statutory licence was 
designed to prevent a producer monopoly, not as an impost on authors. 
If Wagner was robbed, he was robbed as much by publishers as record 
manufacturers. The statutory licence, in theory, ought to benefit 
composers by increasing the dissemination of works and 
simultaneously expanding the base for payment of royalties. 
Robertson undermined the Berne consensus, which asserted moral 
rights as the basis for economic rights. He denied that natural right, 
sacred entitlement or social obligation justified the claims of authors to 
copyright protection. If technology were the means of disseminating a 
work, the person who invented the technology or used the technology 
to disseminate the work, was no less justified in claiming a reward than 
the author. “It is self-evident,” he said, “that the share contributed by 
the author is indispensable, but so also is the work of the artist and  
the manufacturer”. 
These were bold apologetics. Robertson dared to say what no-one else 
would: copyright legislation regulated the production and distribution 
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of goods for commercial purposes. For all the fine words about justice 
for artists, composers were no more deserving and no less grasping 
than any other individuals who contributed to the production of 
records. Shaw, and the other champions of the artistic interest had no 
grounds for reproaching the phonographic industry, said Robertson, 
for doing what was legal: 
Inasmuch as the exclusive right of making mechanical copies of a rendering of his 
work has not yet been conferred on the composer by statute, this particular and novel 
form of reproduction is in public domain and is free to all.  
In any case, making a record did not involve copying, “but a 
registration of the sound waves of the voice of the singer”. Having 
acted within the law, and now facing the introduction of a new right 
that took control of the recording process out of their hands, 
manufacturers were entitled to receive the benefit of the compulsory 
licence. While the industry recognised that “the composer has a claim 
to some measure of protection in respect of phonographic publication” 
Shaw’s talk of theft obscured the real and continuing question as to 
whether property concepts could really fit abstractions: 
I now turn to Mr Shaw’s second proposition … that makers of records have been 
stealing the author’s work in the past. This, of course, can only start from the 
premiss [sic] that an author’s work is property. Whether it ever was so has been the 
subject of endless argumentation; but it is precisely because the author was helpless to 
enforce any property right at Common Law in his published work that the 
Legislature started to find a remedy. 
If, as Robertson implied, the legislature discovered property in a work 
for reasons of politics, the scope of rights conferred should be narrow:  
But, in conferring this great boon on literature, the Act of 1709 did not establish a 
freehold right in an author’s creation. On the contrary, it gave him a leasehold with 
a limited term of years, during which the author would be free from molestation and 
would enjoy statutory protection against trespassers on his domain, but with reversion 
to the public at the end of his lease. 
Shaw, his nervous centres seemingly still paralysed, did not respond to 
Robertson’s letter. Nor did William Boosey, who emphasised the 
Gramophone Company’s vested interest, and was evidently felt much 
concerned about the perceived threat posed to sheet music publishers 
by record sales. But Shaw did, in a certain sense, sum up the  
position when said in his letter that an “injustice has to be done either 
to us artists or the manufacturers.” He was clear about who would win 
 
76 
in Parliament. “They,” he said, “being industrialists are rich and can 
bully Governments.”  
Bullying or not, and certainly rich, the “industrialists” did win in 
Parliament. The Grand Committee added to the Bill a provision 
allowing for compulsory licensing. But it was not as if authors were 
abandoned. The legislation still offered them primary rights. With his 
long experience of politics and publishers, Shaw evidently entertained 
few illusions that copyright regulation might produce justice. In any 
case, justice for industrialists was not justice for Shaw, and justice for 
Shaw did not necessarily mean justice for the public. In the two months 
between Robertson’s last letter in The Times and the last meeting of the 
Grand Committee, he would have pressed his case publicly with vigour. 
Whether or not the Committee members were, as suggested by Shaw, 
bullied behind closed doors, they no doubt based their decision on 
appraisal of economic realities. 
The phonographic industry was not only a powerful economic force, it 
created the gramophone society. In 1913, one third of British 
households possessed gramophones and in 1914, the Gramophone 
Company sold 4 million records. Government could not easily ignore 
the special pleading of which Shaw accused Robertson. At issue, it 
seemed, were employment, investment, dividends, tax revenue and a 
hugely popular source of recreational diversion. It was easy enough for 
the Government to accept the argument that placing the mechanical 
rights in the hands of creators would result in monopoly or cartel. 
Compulsory licensing allowing any manufacturer to make a recording 
of any work recorded – subject to returning to the work’s owner a 
prescribed royalty on sales – offered an appealing solution to politicians 
looking for an equitable compromise between opposed interests. 
The publishers and the restrictions on term 
For all the bitterness aroused in some quarters by the compulsory 
licence, provisions governing the publishing of books most occupied 
the minds of legislators and public during the debates of 1911. This was 
not surprising. Ever since the beginning of the 17th century, when the 
Stationers Company began collaborating with the government in the 
control of books, publishers were villains in the public eye. Politicians 
shared this general dislike, though it did not stop them from passing 
copyright legislation that benefited publishers. Publishers fitted squarely 
into the category of rich and bullying industrialists maligned by George 
Bernard Shaw. As John Murray, a leading publisher, said in a letter to 
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The Times published shortly before the Grand Committee reported, the 
“Government admitted at the start that if the publishers opposed their 
Bill, they could not hope to pass it.”4  
Australian politicians were noticeably hostile to publishers, and since 
British publishers profited ruthlessly from their control of the 
Australian market, they had reason to dislike them. In 1912  
Senator St Ledger reflected the mood of many colleagues when he 
reminded them of Dr Johnson’s satirical paraphrasing of St John’s 
Gospel 18:40: “Now there was a publisher and his name was Barabbas.”5 
British and Australian parliamentarians both referred in the copyright 
debates to the sad story of Milton’s grand-daughter, left  
destitute because her grandfather’s literary estate passed into the hands 
of a publisher.  
As far back as 1842, Talfourd and Macaulay commented on her penury, 
Talfourd as a moral illustrating the need to pass laws providing for the 
welfare of authors and their descendants, Macaulay as evidence that 
such laws only strengthen the hand of publishers. The story was 
certainly a striking one. As Augustine Birrell, writer and Irish 
Nationalist MP, told the Commons in April 1911, for licensing the 
publication of Paradise Lost, Milton received £5 advance, £5 at the end 
of the first run of 1,500 copies, £5 at the end of the second run of 1500 
(which occurred within 2 or 3 years of first publications) and £5 at the 
end of the third impression. When he died, his widow parted with all 
her rights for £8.  
Opposition to publishers, often more visceral than rational, did 
highlight the awkward truth that copyright laws were a form of 
business regulation that did not invariably work to the benefit of 
authors. What was good for publishers – a long copyright term, the 
right of publication and exclusive distribution rights – was not 
automatically good for authors, for whom the terms of their publishing 
contracts were all-important. As the debates of 1911 made plain, 
copyright law represented more of a bargain between commerce and 
law than law and art. 
Unfortunately for publishers, they were businessmen in a peculiar 
business. As the reaction of legislators showed, many people regarded 
the conventional commercial practice of driving hard bargains as 
unseemly if it disadvantaged authors. To make matters worse, 
                                                     
4 Letter John Murray to The Times published 7 July 1911.  
5 The verse says ‘Now there was a thief and his name was Barabbas’ 
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publishers made no attempt to be liked. In letters to The Times, Charles 
James Longman and Thomas Fisher Unwin called the Copyright Bill a 
“wooden gift horse” and a “gross injustice to be remedied”. For good 
measure, John Murray later described Lord Courtenay as the victim of 
“an hallucination” (for suggesting that publishers include in the price of 
a book the cost of supplying copies to certain libraries). He then 
observed that “utmost pains have been taken in drafting the Bill to 
exclude publishers from the extended benefits given to authors.”  
Dogmatic and unflagging, the publishers were as friendly as hungry 
crocodiles. Often self-made, they founded, or inherited, publishing 
houses still successful today – Heinemann, Unwin, John Murray, 
Methuen, Longman and Macmillan. They were tough, calculating and 
unrelenting, the victors in recent memory of a ferocious commercial 
battle with The Times. In 1905, the broadsheet tried to arrest falling 
circulation by introducing the Book Club, which very soon became the 
object of the publishers concentrated fury.  
The Book Club allowed subscribers to sell or lend books to one 
another, resulting in extraordinary price savings. For example, the Club 
advertised Winston Churchill’s Lord Randolph Churchill in 1906 for seven 
shillings instead of 36 shillings. Publishers organised a boycott of the 
newspaper, which replied by asking its readers to boycott Macmillan. 
The battle ended in 1908 when John Murray sued The Times, for libel 
and the court awarded £7500 damages. The paper published letters 
accusing Murray of “simple extortion” but his lawyers showed that 
correspondents underestimated his production costs. Lord Northcliffe, 
The Times’ new owner, then put an end to further arguments and sought 
to pacify the publishers.  
No wonder that politicians, seeing the strength and dogmatism of 
publishers disliked and feared them. There was certainly no trace of 
friendliness towards publishers in the bill presented by Buxton, as they 
loudly pointed out. In particular, they objected to section 4 which 
provided for the republication or performance of works under 
compulsory licence if, after the author’s death, the copyright owner 
unreasonably withheld consent. The compulsory licence could only 
operate 25 years after the first publication of the work. 
At the end of March 1911, William Heinemann spoke disapprovingly 
of section 4 in his presidential address to the annual meeting of 
Publishers Association. In the ensuing three weeks, three more 
publishers took up cudgels in The Times. Frederick Macmillan called 
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section 4 “a grave injustice to authors” and CJ Longman likened it to a 
Trojan horse accompanying the gift of the long posthumous term. 
Edward Bell, the head of George Bell & Sons, wrote to warn that the 
provision posed dangers to authors as well as publishers. He called the 
introduction of a 50 year posthumous term “the most important 
reform” in the Bill but warned that the operation of section 4 would 
confer on the devisees of literary property “a damnosa hereditas.”  
The provision, according to Bell, opened the way to “any speculative 
printer or publisher who may see a chance of making profit for himself 
out of a 6d or 1s edition of a more expensive book published 25 years 
before’. He knew where to lay the blame for the appearance of section 
3. “It is difficult to assign an adequate reason for this irritating 
provision if not to conciliate those supporters of the Government who 
grudge authors any rights at all.” 
Two members of the House of Commons shared his annoyance. On 6 
April, the leader of the Opposition, Arthur Balfour, criticised the 
Government’s “happy detachment” in “so lightly” introducing a 
provision that “if abused, might evidently be a source of infinite 
injustice”. The next day, Augustine Birrell, an Irish Nationalist MP, 
and the author of a book of essays on copyright,6 said, “I confess  
with regard to all this stuff about price, I do not think there is anything 
in it.” 
Parliament supports the 25 year rule 
Parliament’s response provides some indication of the general antipathy 
for publishers. The Grand Committee modified section 4 but not in a 
way that would please its critics. When passed, the Copyright Act 
contained three co-located provisions that publishers could regard as 
inimical to their interests. Section 3 permitted reproduction of works 
for sale 25 years after the death of their authors subject to payment of  
 
                                                     
6 Seven Lectures on the Law and History of Copyright in Books, Rothman & Co, USA, 
1971. Although a member of the Nationalist Party, Birrell was English, not Irish. 
He was Chief Secretary for Ireland 1907–1916 and more highly regarded as a writer 
than as a politician.  
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royalties.7 Section 4 now simply repeated, in substance, the formula in 
clause V of the repealed 1842 Copyright Act, authorising the Privy 
Council to order republication or public performance of a work at any 
time after the death of its author, if the owner withheld consent. 
Section 5(2) prohibited assignment of copyright in a work, except  
by devise under a will, after the expiry of 25 years from the death of  
the author. 
Publishers saw the 50 year posthumous term seemingly shrink to 25 
years. They could not receive an assignment of copyright that lasted for 
more than 25 years after the author’s death, and they now contended 
with a new possibility: at the time they surrendered the copyright (it 
reverted back to the author’s estate), any person giving the prescribed 
notice, and paying royalty of 10 per cent of the retail price of books 
sold, could begin to publish the particular work in competition with 
them. Moreover – an unlikely prospect – they could be forced to 
permit competitors to publish or perform a work if at any time after the 
owner’s death they were judged by the Privy Council’s Judicial 
Committee to be withholding the work from the public. 
Though members of the Grand Committee might have expected that 
sections 3, 4 and 5, as revised, would stir the publishers like hornets 
shaken from their nest, the correspondence page of The Times registered 
no protest. The publishers were probably sensible not to waste energy 
arguing over Parliament’s innovations. They understood that the 
commercial value of most copyright works is exhausted within 25 years 
of publication and no doubt regarded the 25 year rule as commercially 
harmless. They knew too that no applications were made under clause 
V of the 1842 Act, which provided for republication of a book without 
the copyright owner’s consent.  
Forty years later, the Gregory Committee, which recommended the 
changes that led to the British Copyright Act of 1956, called for 
                                                     
7 The journalist and literary compiler Clement K Shorter, may have helped inspire 
the Grand Committee to adopt the 25 year limitation. In a letter to The Times on 20 
April 1911, Shorter disputed Buxton’s statement in his Second Reading speech (7 
April 1911) that “nowadays the author retained it [copyright] in nearly every case.” 
To ensure that authors did not give away their copyright, they had to be protected.  
“Why should it not be definitely laid down in the Copyright Bill that publishers can 
only buy copyright for a limited period, that while the author and the author’s 
executors hold the copyright of his books, for 50 years from his death that these 
books may not be entirely alienated from the author and his executors merely for 
the benefit of publishers?”  
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abolition of the 25 year rule, declaring that section 3 was redundant. 
According to the Committee, it was industry practice for the original 
publisher or a competitor to issue cheap editions long before the elapse 
of 25 years after the author’s death. As for section 4, allowing for 
compulsory licensing of works withheld, no person had applied to the 
Privy Council’s Judicial Committee under the terms of the provision. 
Like section V of the 1842 Act, the provision had not been used. 
The 25 year rule functioned symbolically. The Government evidently 
wished to prevent the publishing trade from relying on the 50 year 
posthumous term to curtail competition. Copyright law, including the 
posthumous term, conferred great privileges on business, and these 
privileges were liable to abuse. The publishers could argue that fears of 
abuse were unwarranted. As the Gregory Committee observed, the 
short currency of most books meant that cheap editions became 
available within a few years of an author’s death, if not before. 
The addition to the Bill of the 25 year rule revealed the curious 
dichotomy between the general enthusiasm for the extension of 
property rights, and the equally general distaste for Shaw’s 
“industrialists”, who stood behind authors as copyright beneficiaries. 
These mixed emotions perhaps burdened copyright legislators. Many 
seemed unable to avoid seeing the process of regulation as a morality 
play, in which authors were innocents and producers villains. But 
framing copyright laws never involved a pure exercise in providing 
economic justice to authors. Now, more than ever, it involved a contest 
for economic advantage, and conferred rights that allowed works to be 
traded as commodities.  
Who benefits? 
Debate over the long posthumous term focused on the question of 
who benefits most from copyright law. Frederick Booth, a Minister and 
the Liberal Member for Pontefract, told the Commons that the 50 year 
posthumous term, however qualified, principally benefited publishers. 
Booth, as he said, championed “the cause of the poor reader, and the 
men who want more enlightenment but who have been deprived of the 
advantage of education earlier in life.” To such people, in his view, “the 
ready access to wholesome and cheap literature is one of the best ends 
that could be achieved” by legislation.  
Unfortunately, “the people behind this Bill are not poor men; they are 
rich publishers and others with a large stock of books and they 
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naturally want as long a period as possible given to their monopoly so 
as to be sure of selling their goods at a profit”. To Booth, Buxton’s 
statement that the 25 year rule would promote “free trade in the 
copyright” seemed risible.  
Booth spoke at the end of July, when the Grand Committee had 
reported on the Bill, and he protested vehemently against 
“arrangements” made “behind the back of the House”. He was, he 
said, “the one outspoken critic of the Bill” following Buxton’s second 
reading speech, and for that reason excluded from the Grand 
Committee. The strength of his feelings can be gauged by the fact that 
he declared that he did not regard the Bill as a Government measure. 
Booth proposed that the Bill be recommitted to a Select Committee for 
more comprehensive treatment but receiving support from only one 
colleague, withdrew the motion. 
Booth reported to the House that he had received letters from 
workingmen throughout Britain protesting that the Bill “attacked” their 
“right and privilege to enjoy cheap literature”. He had also received 
correspondence from publishers who felt the legislation would “put 
money unjustly in their pockets”. In his view, the Grand Committee’s 
changes hardly impeded the wrongful march of the publisher interest. 
If the Government really wished to benefit the public interest, he said, 
it should introduce a 20 year posthumous term. 
In both Houses, only four others, three of whom were members of the 
Liberal Government, joined him in calling for a shorter period of 
copyright protection. The Scottish MP, James Dundas White, who in a 
letter to The Times two months earlier, referred to “a monopoly of 
copyright … set up against the public”, pointed out that the Berlin 
Convention did not compel ratifying countries to adopt the 50 year 
term. Following this point, George Heynes Radford, the Labour 
Member for Islington East, suggested that a posthumous period of 25 
years was appropriate.  
Then a few months later, in the Lords, Lord Courtenay proposed that 
the existing arrangement instituted in 1842 be retained. Like the MPs 
who wanted to limit the posthumous term, Courtenay considered the 
primary object of copyright policy ought to be to encourage the 
dissemination of literature at reasonable prices. To this end, they 
considered a limited term essential. According to Courtenay, speaking 
in November 1911, the “claim for [the] extension was not supported by 
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any injustice shown in the past … and is much to be deprecated in the 
interests of education.” 
These men argued in vain. Buxton, confident of the Government’s 
position (MPs negatived Radford’s proposed amendment of the term 
by 118 votes, 153 to 35), did not waste much time debating the merits 
of the long term. He said simply that the Government introduced the 
new period “in order to bring the law in this country into conformity 
with that in other countries.” Later, he added that though the Grand 
Committee’s decision was irreversible, it made provision for the 25 year 
rule and compulsory licence to guard against abuse. 
In the Lords, Courtenay’s arguments were disposed of without ado. 
Lord Haldane made the doubtful assertion that the Gorrell Committee 
supported the 50 year term after “much discussion and inquiry”. But he 
was on firmer ground when he implied that rights of property do not 
admit of much limitation. “My noble friend,” he said, “proposes to 
treat authors in a different way from that in which the law treats other 
people in respect of their property.” 
Lord Gorrell naturally agreed. As he said, submissions to the 
Committee he chaired in 1909 supported term extension.  
Furthermore, he declared, the new term “would not militate against  
the production of cheap editions, for publishers and authors found  
that it paid them to appeal to a wide public.” So the long posthumous 
term passed into law with little controversy. The publishers focused 
their attention on another topic. Though they found the 25 year rule, in 
the words of Edward Bell, “irritating”, they were concerned, almost 
obsessively, with a subject that, to the modern eye, seems of minor 
economic importance. 
Compulsory deposit 
The 1842 Act required publishers, on demand (and on pain of a £5 
fine), to deliver a copy of each book published to the Stationers 
Company, as well as to the Bodleian Library, the Public Library of 
Cambridge, the Library of the Faculty of Advocates at Edinburgh and 
the Library of Trinity College, Dublin. The Bill of 1911 enlarged 
slightly on this stipulation, requiring publishers to supply a copy of  
each new publication to the British Museum and adding the Welsh 
National Library to the list of institutions entitled to demand delivery 
of new books. 
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The practice of compulsory (now called statutory) deposit began in the 
early 17th century. According to the publisher John Murray (in a letter 
to The Times of 7 July 1911), the “compulsory presentation of copies of 
all books published began in 1602, when no book was permitted to be 
printed without a licence”. According to Murray, it “was apparently 
with a view to enforcing the provisions of the Act, and bringing all 
books readily to the cognisance of the censors, that three copies had to 
be delivered gratis – one to the King’s Library, one to Oxford, and one 
to Cambridge”. 8  
After Heinemann, Longman, Unwin and Bell protested over section 4 
of the Copyright Bill in April 1911, the publishers concentrated their 
full attention on the question of compulsory deposit. From May until 
the Lords approved the final version of the Bill in November, Murray, 
Heinemann and Unwin poured out, in the pages of The Times, their 
complaints against the tyranny of section 15 (‘Delivery of Books to 
Libraries’). They – mostly the indefatigable Murray – rushed into print 
on no fewer than 12 occasions, engaging a variety of opponents, the 
officials of Cambridge University and the National Library of Wales, 
“an author”, “a reader”,9 even the MP Dundas White. 
In a final gambit in November, the Council of the Publishers 
Association of Great Britain and Ireland addressed a Memorandum on 
the Copyright Bill to the House of Lords. The Memorandum criticised 
the “exaction” as a “remnant of an enactment connected with the 
                                                     
8 Murray repeated a common myth about compulsory deposit. The practice 
resulted from the efforts of a private citizen not government’s wish to control 
opposition or dissent. It began in 1610 when Sir Thomas Bodley, who wanted to 
expand Oxford University’s library, secured the agreement of the Stationer’s 
Company to supply the university with copies of works produced. A Star Chamber 
decree, and then Licensing Acts of 1662 and 1664, gave legal force to the 
arrangement and the licensing Acts required that books be supplied also to the 
Royal Library and Cambridge University library. The Government did censor 
books collected by this device, and probably passed the licensing Acts to facilitate 
censorship. However, Bodley intended to create a bibliographic record of English 
literature. See John Gilchrist, “Copyright Deposit, Legal Deposit or Library 
Deposit? The Government’s Role as Preserver of Copyright Material”, Queensland 
University of Technology Law and Justice Journal, Vol 5 No 2, 2005. 
9 Quite commonly correspondents identified themselves by a title rather than name. 
The letter of “An author” published on 21 November called the publishers’ 
arguments “absurdly exaggerated”, and “strongly deprecate[d] any alteration of the 
existing practice”. The writer noted that if compulsory deposit were “[r]egarded as 
a tax, authors, whom the publishers take care to pass it on to, would willingly pay it, 
in return for more adequate protection of their copyright”.  
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literary censorship” and said that publishers “feel very acutely the 
injustice of the burden which they are singled out from all other classes 
of the community to bear”. 
Two weeks after the Lords received the Memorandum, John Murray 
wrote to The Times summing up the publishers’ ostensible source of 
grievance. By then, the cause was lost. According to Murray: “if matters 
had been left as they were we would have remained silent; but when we 
discover that it [compulsory deposit] is regarded as capable of 
extension for new institutions, and as we have no guarantee that this 
extension may not be continued in future, we consider that it is time to 
take objection”. In the same letter, he said that if politicians considered 
the compulsory supply of books a national necessity, the nation, and 
not publishers alone, should bear the costs involved. “If it is a national 
duty and the country is so wealthy, the injustice of throwing this 
national and Imperial impost on one small body of citizens becomes all 
the more glaring.” 
A week earlier, William Heinemann wrote to The Times to make plain to 
the Lords that publishers “object in principle to the unjust tax levied 
upon us.” He severely criticised the publishers’ opponents for their 
“airiness of attitude”, which, he said, was “characteristic of practically 
all the arguments used on behalf of the University libraries to maintain 
a privilege they have acquired in a not over-creditable way.” More to 
the point, the supply of free books could be counted “equal to an 
addition of over 3d in the pound to the income tax I already paid on 
the profits of my business.”10 
Murray said in correspondence published shortly before Heinemann’s 
that publishers resented being “mulcted”. The unfairness of section 15 
pointed to the right course of action. Invented, according to Murray, as 
a device to assist official censorship, compulsory deposit should be 
abolished. The “sole pretext which could have justified so unusual  
and unjust a tax has long ago disappeared, and yet we are compelled to  
pay it still, and it is being increased as a sop to certain supporters of  
the Government.” 
The publishers’ furious reaction to section 15 and the energy they 
expended on seeking to overturn the provision doubtless perplexed 
legislators. Even if the statistic quoted by Heinemann were correct, the 
cost to publishers of supplying free books to certain libraries was 
                                                     
10 Letter WM Heinemann to The Times, 23 November 1911. 3d was threepence; 
there were 240 pence in the pound.  
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insignificant. The real reason for their hostility, which they may have 
been reluctant to disclose, is to be found in the letter of “A Reader” to 
The Times in November 1911. The letter pointed out that, it “is perhaps 
not the five copies that hurt the publishers, but the 50 that would have 
sold, had not the book been in the University Library. But against this 
may be set the 500 readers who would never see the book if it was not 
in the library.” 
If the publishers opposed compulsory deposit because they feared that 
libraries threatened their business, they were, to borrow John Murray’s 
phrase deprecating Lord Courtenay, “victims of a hallucination”.  
They were wealthy men and their businesses were flourishing, so their 
sense of grievance must have seemed inexplicable. The history of 
copyright regulation shows that paranoia is frequently the companion 
of vested interest.  
Coleridge-Taylor and compulsory royalties 
In November 1912, the Society of Authors launched in London an 
appeal for the widow and children of the composer Samuel Coleridge-
Taylor. Author of the popular song Hiawatha, Coleridge-Taylor died 
three months earlier, leaving his family in straitened circumstances. The 
Chairman of the Society’s Committee of Management, J Squire Sprigge, 
wrote to The Times to publicise the appeal, and suggested that the 
musical publishers Novello & Co were implicated in the family’s 
poverty. In the course of advocating a system of compulsory royalties, 
he said the musician’s case supplied “an admirable example of the 
trouble that may and often does follow upon the outright sale of 
literary or artistic property”. 
Given the popularity of Coleridge-Taylor’s work, why was his estate 
threadbare? In Sprigge’s view, because Novello & Co, bought the rights 
to Hiawatha outright: “it is our experience,” he said, “that it is the 
author of the work who is generally disappointed by the disposal of 
copyright.” Sprigge opposed outright assignment because “a system is 
bad in business which by its capricious event leaves behind it either a 
recollection of pecuniary loss with the publisher or a deep sense of 
injustice with the author.” If the value of sales much exceeded the price 
of assignment, authors who had assigned their rights for a nominal fee 
could be left impoverished.  
Sprigge criticised the publishers for taking advantage of their superior 
bargaining strength to secure the assignment of Hiawatha at a low price 
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and refuse royalties. Royalties, he said, “would have provided sufficient 
money for the dependants without any appeal to the public.” The case 
of Coleridge-Taylor testified to the truth that, “in all the usual 
circumstances, and especially in the cases of young writers and 
composers, the disposal of copyright is to be absolutely avoided and 
the royalty system should be adopted.” According to Sprigge, the 
royalty system distributed risk equitably, saving the publisher from the 
cost of purchasing copyright in a work and allowing the author to share 
in sales revenue.  
Five days later, Novello & Co replied in The Times that it did not object 
to paying royalties. It adopted the royalty system 40 years previously 
and made “constant use” of it “in suitable cases”. The publisher 
responded obliquely to the implication that it took advantage of 
Coleridge-Taylor, stating that, “it is characteristic of young and 
unknown composers that they usually desire to sell their works 
outright”. But it rejected the proposition that the composer did not 
benefit from his dealings with Novello & Co. The firm published six 
Coleridge-Taylor works, securing an assignment of three and paying 
royalties on the others.  
The composer Sir Charles Stanford quickly joined the controversy. In 
two letters to The Times, he claimed that Novello & Co drove hard 
bargains with Coleridge-Taylor in his early career, refusing his request 
for royalties on one work and insisting on complete assignment in 
return for 20 copies of the work when published. According to 
Stanford, Coleridge-Taylor, accepted these terms because he was 
unknown, and desperate for recognition. As for Hiawatha, the 
“question is … its profits and where they went, and the grounds upon 
which the appeal to the public for the composer’s family has been 
rendered necessary at all.” 
Novello & Co replied that Coleridge Taylor did not ask for a royalty on 
sales of Hiawatha. In other words, the publisher seemed to say, caveat 
vendor. If Coleridge-Taylor, contracting freely, and in his right mind, 
struck a poor bargain, the publisher could not be said to be responsible 
for his later poverty. The last words in The Times went to Sprigge, 
writing again on behalf of the Society of Authors. Of Novello & Co, 
Sprigge said: 
They say that Mr Coleridge-Taylor was not refused a royalty. The real question is – 
Did he obtain a royalty? … under a fair royalty system such an unfortunate 
position as we have in Mr Coleridge-Taylor’s case – viz the need for a pecuniary 
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appeal to the public on behalf of the dead author of a famous and popular work – 
could not occur often. For the author would have received during his lifetime and his 
dependants would be receiving after his death, a due share of the profits earned by his 
work and genius. 
The exchange of letters in The Times lasted a little over two weeks. 
Then, at the beginning of January 1913, The Musical Times reprinted the 
entire correspondence. It did so for a better reason than further 
darkening the reputation of publishers. The controversy over 
Coleridge-Taylor’s estate hinted at the beginnings of the movement to 
the collective administration of rights. The Society of Authors appeared 
to want the Government to institute a system that supposedly 
overcame the problem of unequal bargaining power by allowing the 
composer a fixed share of sales. However, over the next year, a 
different solution became apparent.  
In 1914, composers and publishers established the Performing Right 
Society to collect revenue on their behalf for the performance of 
musical works. They created a model of taxation that, once emulated, 
allowed copyright owners to license and claim remuneration for every 
conceivable use of copyright material. A decade later, the Performing 
Right Society helped to establish its Australian counterpart which, in 
the years leading to the Second World War, enforced its right to collect 
fees for the performance of musical works.  
After 1913, Sprigge’s proposal for a system of compulsory royalty 
payments to bring equality to the bargains between publishers and 
authors went no further. The hard reality of inequality of bargaining 
power continued to govern creator-producer relations and for most 
authors, contract determined income. But the appearance of the PRS 
signalled something new and radical in thinking abut copyright. 
Henceforward, the law would work to deliver revenue to owners 
predictably and comprehensively.  
Fair dealing 
Private and public interests 
The creation of a system for collecting revenue for the licensed use of 
copyright material pointed to the remarkable possibilities for profit the 
law offered to copyright owners. Authors, and the industries that relied 
on their works to supply mass entertainment, were now placed in a 
position to demand payment for allowing copyright material to be 
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copied, transformed, fixated, performed or otherwise used. Use 
determined remuneration: the person who wished to exercise any of the 
exclusive rights of copyright must pay the owner of the right for a 
licence to do so.  
The Act of 1911 transformed the scope of copyright regulation beyond 
the imagining of the men who created the legislation it replaced, and 
those who passed the Australian Act of 1905. Before 1911, copyright 
laws functioned primarily to allow publishers to control the supply of 
books in Britain and its Empire. After 1911, they regulated the large 
scale production of books, records and films, and, in the case of 
records and films, their public performance. 
The growth of collective rights administration, pioneered by the 
Performing Right Society, and the ever-increasing revenue from licence 
fees generally, marched in step with the continuing growth of the 
copyright industries, and the explosion in mass entertainment. These 
developments reinforced the status of the Berne Convention and 
vindicated, in their own eyes, the assertiveness of the advocates of 
authors rights. But the headlong rush to profit gave rise to a disquieting 
question. The new rights benefited the copyright owner but did they 
much benefit buyer of books and records, the viewer of films, and, 
shortly, the radio listener?  
Apart from the conventional statements about the moral entitlement of 
authors, little in the official literature indicated that policy makers were 
motivated to consider public before private interest. From the 
publication of the Gorrell Report until the passage of the 1911 Act, 
law-makers concerned themselves principally with conferring  
economic privileges on designated categories of copyright owner. Even 
when qualifying the exclusive rights for the benefit of the public, 
legislators framed limitations to protect the commercial interests of 
copyright owners. 
Section 2(1) of the 1911 Copyright Bill, which specified the acts not 
constituting infringement of copyright,11 permitted the public to make 
                                                     
11 “Copyright in a work shall be deemed to be infringed by any person who, 
without the consent of the owner of the copyright, does anything the sole right to 
do which is by this Act conferred on the owner of the copyright: Provided that the 
following acts shall not constitute an infringement of copyright:- 
(i) Any fair dealing with any work for the purposes of private study, research, 
criticism, review or newspaper summary … ” The next five sub-paragraphs in the 
provision dealt with the non–reproductive use of artistic works for creating other 
artistic works, the making or publishing of paintings, photographs etc of sculptures 
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certain uses of copyright material without permission or payment, but 
not in ways that could not undermine the flow of revenue to copyright 
owners. The acts enumerated involved non-commercial and 
educational uses, and were cast in narrow, qualified terms that could 
hardly be said to demonstrate that the Government prepared the Bill 
with much thought for public welfare.  
The Grand Committee showed still less inclination to permit limitation 
of the exclusive rights. As Buxton said before the Commons in July 
1911, section 2(1) “aroused a great deal of controversy” among 
Committee members. They added, according to the Liberal maverick 
Josiah Wedgwood, “proviso to proviso” to avoid “pitfalls” seen to 
threaten the copyright owner’s interests. In the end, perhaps the most 
expansive, and certainly the most recognised proviso merely allowed a 
person to make a ‘fair dealing’ with any work “for the purposes of 
private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper study”.12  
The contents of section 2(1) betoken how legislators came to a new 
understanding of the purpose of copyright law, one that reflected the 
emergence of a new hegemony, that of the copyright “owner”. The 
new power of the copyright owner derived not only from the exclusive 
rights but also the enactment of offences for exercising the rights 
without permission.  
The 1842 Copyright Act proscribed ‘Piracy of Books’, the unauthorised 
printing, import, publication or possession of books for ‘Sale or Hire’, 
and the sale or hire of such books, or the offering of the books for sale 
or hire.13 Before 1911, the prohibition against piracy did not apply to 
                                                                                                           
or works of architecture, the publication, for schools of short passages of copyright 
works in mainly non-copyright collections, the publication of public lectures in 
newspapers, and public reading or recitation by an individual of a reasonable extract 
from a published work. 
12 The Australian Copyright Act 1905, section 28 said: “Copyright in a book shall 
not be infringed by a person making an abridgement or translation of the book for 
his private use (unless he uses it publicly or allows it to be used publicly by some 
other person), or by a person making fair copies from or otherwise fairly dealing 
with the contents of the book for the purpose of a new work, or for the purpose of 
criticism, review or refutation, or in the ordinary course of reporting scientific 
information.” The British Act, unlike the Australian, allowed for fair dealing for 
private study or newspaper summary but the Australian Act seemed to contemplate 
a broader ambit of copying activity by the individual.  
13 Clause XV of the Act was called ‘Remedy for the Piracy of Books by Action on 
the Case’. The purpose of prohibition was to protect the owners of literary 
property from pirate presses in France and Ireland as well as the United Kingdom.  
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the unauthorised use of a book for a purpose other than sale or hire. The 
enforcement provisions of the 1911 Act, however, did away with the 
limited construction of the owner’s privilege. They declared 
unauthorised reproduction or performance of a work by anyone for any 
purpose an infringement.  
According to the Act, a person infringed copyright “who, without the 
consent of the owner of the copyright, does anything the sole right to 
do which is by this Act conferred.” Under the legislation, any person 
who exercised any right ‘exclusive’ to the owner, for any purpose, 
committed an offence – save for the operation of section 2(1), the fair 
dealing provision, and section 19(2), the compulsory licence 
provision.14 After 1911, the progressive elaboration in legislation of 
owners’ rights resulted in related expansion in the total of statutory 
remedies available to the owner.  
The copyright owner became a punitive figure, enforcing the 
multiplying remedies and forcefully ejecting, in the words of John 
Drummond Robertson, “trespassers on his domain”. In one sense, the 
1911 Act treated copyright trespassers more kindly than previous 
legislation. They were now declared “infringers” not “pirates”. The 
change in terminology occurred thanks to the Government Minister 
Frederick Booth who attacked as “wrong and ridiculous” the time-
honoured convention of calling breaches of copyright “piratical”. This 
characterisation reflected, he said, questionable assumptions about the 
moral content of property rights. 
He asserted that the word “pirate” should not be applied to “the poor 
people who stood in the gutters of our streets and furtively sold copies 
of a work to the public”. Using the description “so as to apply to the 
poor seller of goods only served to prejudice a man when placed on his 
trial, [it] being afterwards applied to him as a stigma”. He proposed that 
the word “infringing” be substituted in the Bill for the word “pirated”. 
The Unionist MP, Sir William Anson, opposed his motion on the 
                                                     
14 According to Patterson, supra, US courts in the 19th century distinguished 
between the use of the copyright and the use of the work. The Constitution allowed 
copyright owners to restrain piracy but stated that the purpose of copyright was to 
“promote the progress of Science and the useful Arts”. In Patterson’s analysis, the 
Constitution intended that copyright would promote learning while also protecting 
the author from the piracies of commercial competitors. Its purpose was to 
disseminate, its function to protect. The fair use doctrine was promulgated to allow 
competitors to use a copyright work provided the use did not provide an unfair 
commercial advantage. Non-commercial uses were never considered infringements.  
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grounds that the word “pirated” was not “an offensive [description] to 
apply to persons who appropriated the property of other people” but 
the House accepted the amendment. 
Public access  
The ascendancy of copyright owners is traceable not only to the 
prestige of the Berne Convention, the proselytising of its adherents and 
the aggressive lobbying of the phonographic industry. Already in the 
United States, in the later 19th century, courts determining the 
boundaries of copyright protection began to assert the hegemony of 
copyright ownership. They did so by developing the “fair use” doctrine, 
which permitted free unauthorised public access to copyright material 
in restricted circumstances. Fair use, ostensibly a doctrine promoting 
public access to copyright material, entrenched the author’s 
prerogatives as the determinant of copyright subsistence. In defining 
the circumstances in which a person could use copyright material 
gratuitously and without permission, the courts accepted the 
presumption – not previously adopted – that any other unlicensed use 
constituted infringement. 
In Britain, courts in the 18th century developed the concept of “fair 
abridgement” – the basis for the statutory category of “fair dealing” – 
to permit a person other than the author to abridge a work for private, 
(but not commercial) purposes. In applying the relevant provisions of 
legislation to protect the author from piracy, 19th century judges faced 
the question of what the non-copyright holder was permitted to do. The 
1911 Act answered the question simply, declaring, in section 2(1), that 
copyright in a work “shall be deemed to be infringed by any person 
who, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, does anything 
the sole right to do which is by this Act conferred on the owner of  
the copyright.”  
The courts’ gradual delineation of authors’ rights created, inevitably, a 
metaphorical territory of copyright. Some scholars have drawn an 
analogy between the common law process of mapping authors’ rights 
and the enclosure of common land in Britain after the Reformation. In 
both instances, the law ratified expropriation of subject matter held in 
common. In the 17th century, common land became private land, and 
the new landholders erected fences to repel trespassers. In the 19th 
century, according to scholars, lawyers began the still continuing 
process of seizure and enclosure of the intellectual commons. As 
defined, fair use constituted a public right of way across private 
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property, a limited privilege granted as a convenience to those who 
would otherwise be trespassers. The doctrine, far from benefiting  
the public, testified to the steady alienation of territory once common 
to all.15  
The common law moved inevitably in the direction of treating 
copyright subject matter as an exclusive possession, foreclosed from 
the public except by permission or for specified purposes, such as fair 
dealing.16 Reasons for the enclosure of the abstract domain are not hard 
to find. Statutory rights, once conferred, must be interpreted, and the 
process of interpreting and elaborating tends to enlarge rather than 
reduce the ambit of those rights. In the English-speaking world, 
cultural axioms create in lawyers deep psychological aversion to 
hedging the claims of property, even in the realm of abstractions. 
19th century developments in the United States, in particular, testify to 
this truth. When the United States enacted federal copyright codes in 
1790 and 1831, politicians, remembering the independence struggle, 
wanted to ensure that copyright not be used prevent free speech or 
allow censorship. The second Act granted the author “the sole right 
and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending” a work and 
it fell to the courts to determine the extent to which the Constitution 
limited or enlarged the right. Judges were called upon to consider  
the effect of Article I, section 8, cl.8 of the Constitution, which grants 
Congress power to make laws to “promote the Progress of Sciences 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”  
and the First Amendment, which guarantees freedom of speech and  
the press.  
Taken together, the constitutional directive to make copyright laws to 
promote learning, and the First Amendment’s guarantee of free 
expression, could be expected to influence courts to define authors’ 
rights narrowly. But judges ultimately resolved the conflict between the 
                                                     
15 See e.g. Hannibal Travis, “Pirates of the Information Infrastructure: Blackstonian 
Copyright and the First Amendment” (2000) Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 15(2), 
pp 1–65. 
16 The Australian Act of 1905 dispensed with the presumption that copyright 
infringement must involve activity directed towards commercial advantage – “[i]f 
any person infringes any right conferred by this Act …” – and it made the 
important concession that “private use” of a book was not an offence. Moreover, 
in theory, it embraced a broader version of fair dealing, allowing for “fair extracts” 
as well as specified fair dealings.  
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claims of property and free speech in favour of the former. The fair use 
doctrine implicitly asserted the sovereignty of the copyright owner over 
the use of expressive content, making public access to information a 
highly conditional privilege.  
As one scholar observed, codification of the fair use doctrine in the 
1909 US Copyright Act “brought consumer conduct within the realm 
of infringement” and started “a termitic infestation of the constitutional 
right of free speech”. According to the same scholar, in the century 
ensuing since the Act of 1909, fair use law “enlarge[d] the concept of 
infringement at the expense of the individual consumer’s right to copy 
the work for the purposes of learning.”17 
In legislation, the expanding range of rights and offences marked most 
clearly the hegemony of the owner. In the 19th century, the statutes of 
both the United States and United Kingdom defined infringement 
narrowly. In Britain, piracy constituted the sole copyright offence. The 
fair dealing provisions in the 1911 Act, and its enumeration of 
copyright offences, confirmed the new status of the copyright owner. 
Statutory provisions forgiving what would otherwise be construed as 
trespass on the owner’s property – namely the fair dealing provisions as 
they were progressively enunciated – were now understood as a 
concession to the “public interest”. When Parliament struck a balance 
between the public and private interest in 1911, it did so very firmly in 
favour of the latter. 
1912 Parliamentary debate in Australia 
The necessity for conformity 
The Australian federal Parliament passed the Copyright Act of 1912 in 
a period of intense legislative activity – between 1910 and 1913, 
Parliament passed 113 Bills. This fact may account for the relatively 
perfunctory treatment given by both Houses to many substantive 
                                                     
17 Lyman Patterson, supra. Patterson stated that: “copyright has both a purpose and 
a function. The purpose is to promote learning; the function is to protect the 
author’s economic interest. The function, however, must serve the purpose, not 
vice versa. To say that the copyright owner has a right to the profit and a right to 
deny public access is to fly in the face of the constitutional scheme of copyright. 
The purpose of copyright relates to the use of the work; the function of copyright 
relates to the use of the copyright. In order to protect the author against the use of 
the copyright, it is not necessary to deny the consumer the use of the work..”(P46). 
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portions of the Bill after its introduction in July.18 Legislators debated 
the Bill at some length in October 1912 but they considered provisions 
largely in committee, spending considerable time on questions of 
machinery and drafting. 
Politicians resolved to incorporate the British Copyright Act of 1911 in 
the new copyright legislation for pragmatic reasons. As Australian 
parliamentarians knew, uniform legislative rules throughout the Empire 
were an important preliminary to creating the uniform system favoured 
by imperialist politicians. They also knew that the privileges enjoyed by 
members of the Berne Union flowed to Australia in its capacity as a 
British possession, not as an individual State. Until Australia joined the 
Union in its own right, it must align its legislation to that of Britain or 
risk ostracism from the Berne family. 
As standing outside the Union seemed to be unthinkable, and 
numerous politicians subscribed to the ideal of imperial unity, it may 
seem self-evident that in 1912 parliamentarians agreed on the necessity 
for adopting the British Act. In fact, the Labor Government, 
manifesting some of the independent spirit of the parliamentary 
generation of 1905, responded to British developments by introducing 
in 191119 independent legislation to extend Australian copyright 
protection to the works of authors in Britain, the Empire or the 
countries of the Berne Union. 
The Government soon learnt that any new copyright legislation must 
conform to British requirements. On 1 December, shortly before 
passing its own copyright Bill, the imperial Government communicated 
to its antipodean counterpart a politely coercive message: failure to 
adopt British copyright legislation would mean that Britain would no 
longer recognise Australian copyright. Equally importantly, if Australia 
did not adopt the legislation its Act would not fulfil the requirements of 
the amended Berne Convention. 
A few days later, Lord Tennyson, silent since the London Copyright 
Conference, cabled the Prime Minister, Fisher, to “earnestly request 
you to postpone Bill till you have text imperial act [sic].” His message 
emphasised the necessity for uniformity and the risk of falling out-of-
step with the Union. “There was,” said Tennyson, “friendly and 
unanimous feeling at Conference last year and desire on the part of all 
to get legislation on uniform lines … By your action you may put 
                                                     
18 The Governor General assented to the Bill on 20 November.  
19 In November, prior to the passage of the British legislation.  
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yourselves outside limits Berlin convention and place myself and the 
Government in an awkward position.”  
Fisher’s Government did not hurry to comply with British requests. 
But sometime in early 1912, it dropped the draft bill and concentrated 
on preparing new legislation that incorporated the British Act and 
included various provisions specific to Australian conditions. No-one, 
however, expressed enthusiasm for the British legislation. In October, 
Senator Keating called the Act “unintelligible to the ordinary person … 
drafted in such a way that it is impossible for the layman to follow it.”20 
By contrast, he said, the Australian Act “is, to those interested in its 
operation, at least intelligible. On the other hand, to those interested in 
its operation, and to those who may be called upon to interpret it, the 
English Act that we are about to adopt is not always intelligible.” 
Commenting on section 13(2) of the British Act, which dealt with 
compensation, Keating said, “some of our latest admitted barristers and 
solicitors would have been capable of drafting that clause in a more 
lucid way … I could quote other clauses which are far worse in respect 
to draftsmanship.” In the House of Representatives, the Attorney 
General, Billy Hughes, expressed a similar view: “I am bound to say 
that not only in this, but in other sections, the drafting of the Act leaves 
a great deal to be desired, and that the field for litigation seems to be 
most prolific.” 
But, as Keating said, the Government had “no alternative” to adopting 
the imperial legislation. 
If we are going to impose conditions with respect to copyright which are not recognised 
by the International Copyright Union, we shall be setting ourselves up as different 
from nearly every other civilised nation in the world. It should be our desire to come 
into line with them. 
The Government’s decision meant the loss of legislative autonomy. 
Parliamentary debate on the 1912 Copyright Bill could only be 
significantly constrained, for the incorporation provision in the British 
Act made plain that the British Parliament did not envisage the 
dominions making even modest changes to substantive clauses.21 
                                                     
20 Hansard 23 October 1912, p4512.  
21 Section 25(1) read as follows: “This Act, except such of the provisions thereof as 
are expressly restricted to the United Kingdom, shall extend throughout His 
Majesty’s Dominions: Provided that it shall not extend to a self–governing 
dominion, unless declared by the Legislature of the that dominion to be in force 
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Sure enough, much of the debate over the Copyright Bill involved a 
dreary exchange of non sequiturs on subjects ranging from library 
deposit to the accuracy of the marginal notes to legislation. Only 
Patrick Glynn complained, in the House of Representatives, at the 
length of the proposed copyright term. He reminded the House that 
two years earlier, the Labor Government itself sent a memorandum to 
Britain protesting the proposed 50 year posthumous term. The other 
MPs did not seem to care much.  
They realised that discussion of the legislative provisions could only be, 
for the most part, a waste of time. In the Senate, Sir Josiah Symon, the 
outstanding contributor to the debates of 1905 remained silent. Never a 
frequent speaker, the end of his parliamentary career neared and his 
party no longer favoured him.22 His silence symbolised the change in 
approach to matters of copyright policy between 1905 and 1912. 
In that time, a new understanding superseded the conception of 
copyright as a limited set of rights directed towards protecting the 
owner of literary or musical property from unauthorised copiers. The 
success of the Berlin Conference made clear that substantive debate on 
issues such as the copyright term would now take place at conferences 
of the Berne Union. The Union had become the motor of legislative 
change. No wonder that Symon had nothing to say. 
Import controls 
A small minority of parliamentarians in 1912 did contest an element of 
the British legislation that operated to the undoubted disadvantage of 
Australians – the grant to the copyright owner of exclusive control over 
the distribution of copyright material. Britain introduced distribution 
controls in the early 18th century to limit the influx from the Continent 
and Ireland of pirated books. Controls worked by vesting in copyright 
owners exclusive control of the distribution of copyright material. 
Owners could prosecute in British courts any person who imported 
                                                                                                           
therein either without any modifications or additions, or with such modifications 
and additions relating exclusively to procedure and remedies, or necessary to adapt 
this Act to the circumstances of the dominion, as may be enacted by such 
Legislature.”  
22 He ran for Parliament as an Independent in 1913, and lost.  
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books for sale or hire without their permission, and used their power to 
control the supply of books.23  
After the 1800 Act of Union that made Ireland formally a part of the 
United Kingdom, book piracy, previously a flourishing activity, 
gradually disappeared because copyright holders were able to enforce in 
Irish courts the provisions of British copyright and customs legislation. 
With the passing of the Copyright Act of 1842, the owner’s exclusive 
power applied, under section XVII, to all British possessions, creating a 
monopoly, throughout the Empire, over the import or export of 
legitimate copyright material. Naturally, British publishers greatly 
valued import controls as a device for stifling competition. As long as 
colonials were debarred from importing (or domestic suppliers from 
exporting) books without the copyright owner’s licence,24 the latter was 
free to determine price, range and quantities free from the imperatives 
of competition. 
British publishers were, as their letters to The Times during the 1911 
copyright debates showed, viscerally attached to the distribution 
monopoly, particularly as it related to the colonies. The ties of history 
intensified the emotions some exporters. C J Longman, for instance, 
could look back 150 years to the days when his great-grandfather 
transformed Longman into a great exporter of books to the North 
American colonies. His uncle published a pamphlet on colonial 
copyright in 1872. For the publishers, so it seemed, Providence 
conjured countries like Australia to supply them with captive markets 
until the end of time.  
Shortly before the introduction of the 1911 Copyright Bill, William 
Heinemann addressed the Publishers Association and warned of the 
dangers to the import monopoly posed by “certain socialistic 
pretensions existing exclusively so far in certain of the Colonies”. 
Months earlier, Lord Tennyson cabled the Australian Government to 
advise it of a measure in the British Copyright Bill that would make 
                                                     
23 Section XVII of the 1842 Copyright Act established import controls. The 
marginal note stated: “No person except the proprietor, &c. shall import into the 
British Dominions for Sale or Hire any Book first composed &c. within the United 
Kingdom and reprinted elsewhere, under penalty of Forfeiture, and if so of 10l. and 
double the value; and Books may be seized by Officers of Customs and Excise.”  
24 Divisibility of copyright, recognised domestically in Australia in the 1905 Act, 
and introduced in imperial legislation in the 1911 Act, meant that the British 
copyright owner could grant copyright for a territory to a local who could then 
print and publish a British work in the territory.  
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publishers liable for proceedings in Australia as well as Britain. The 
publishers, said Tennyson, found the prospect “intolerable”. Why not, 
he asked, amend Australian legislation to ensure the owner of an 
Australian work could only be sued in Australia, and the owner of a 
British work in Britain? 
Domestic publishers were also high-handed. In August 1911, George 
Robertson, co-founder of Angus and Robertson booksellers, 
dispatched a handwritten note to Billy Hughes (it began “Dear W 
Hughes”) curtly protesting against the “extraordinary omission of the 
British Government” to introduce in its Copyright Bill a provision that 
retaliated against the manufacturing provision in the United States’ 
Copyright Act. The tenor of the letter implied that Hughes ought to fix 
the anomaly and the latter certainly responded with alacrity.  
He promised to “communicate with the Home Government in 
reference to the omission” and a fortnight later, the Registrar of 
Copyrights supplied him with a report titled “Angus & Robertson Ltd, 
Literary Copyright – Provisions of English, American and Australian 
Laws”. Representations made on Robertson’s behalf, however, were 
unavailing. The Commons briefly debated a proposal to add to the 
Copyright Bill a retaliatory manufacturing provision, but Government 
pressure led to withdrawal of the proposal.  
Adoption of the British Copyright Act did not automatically mean that 
Australia must adopt rules that allowed British publishers, or their 
licensees, to monopolise the supply to Australia of books produced or 
sold in Britain. Under section 25(1) of the British Act, the self-
governing dominions could adopt the legislation “with such 
modifications and additions relating exclusively to procedure and 
remedies, or necessary to adapt this Act to the circumstances of the 
dominion.” However, to undo the import provisions enunciated in 
section 14 of the British Act, parliamentarians needed to be certain that 
any nullifying changes constituted modification or addition adapting the 
provisions to Australian conditions.  
Few, if any, legislators could have declared with confidence that section 
25(1) contemplated revocation of the import provisions. Attempting to 
decipher the section, they would more likely concur with Hughes’s 
statement that the drafting of the Act left “a great deal to be desired”, 
or perhaps agree Keating’s observation that the legislation was 
“unintelligible”. Section 14(7), did, however, provide some clarity.  
It said of section 14 as a whole: “This section shall, with the  
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necessary modifications, apply to the importation into a British 
possession to which this Act extends of copies of works made out of 
that possession.”  
Even if the apparent intent of section 14(7) were ignored and legislators 
thought it theoretically possible to revoke the prohibition expressed in 
section 14, practicality stood in the way. Any weakening of the import 
rules would cause a row with Britain and complicate incorporation of 
the British Act. For the great majority of parliamentarians such a course 
of action seemed unthinkable. They supported unwaveringly section 10 
of the Australian Copyright Bill which vested in Australian copyright 
holders control over the import of copyright works. 
Debate over the import monopoly 
The import monopoly did, nonetheless, occupy the greatest amount of 
debating time and, more than any copyright issue discussed in 
Parliament in either 1905 or 1912, aroused the passions of a few 
speakers. Exchanges were frank. On one occasion Keating said of the 
Labor Senator Gregory McGregor, who betrayed no understanding that 
the monopoly might penalise consumers, “I really begin to totter my 
belief that the Vice-President of the Executive Council understands the 
Bill with which he is dealing.” 
Australian legislators chose to believe the comforting illusion that 
British and Australian interests were indivisible and laws made by the 
former must benefit the latter. Though Joseph Vardon and John 
Keating pointed out to senators the importance of legislating in 
Australia’s interest, and Keating implored them to reconsider their 
endorsement of the distribution monopoly, the need for imperial 
uniformity remained a predominant concern. In debate, none of the 
proponents of import controls advanced a single substantive argument 
for their re-enactment. 
Vardon, a successful printer and publisher before entering politics, and 
a committed opponent of the distribution monopoly, drew attention to 
its intended function as a deterrent to piracy. Hughes, who introduced 
the Copyright Bill in the House of Representatives, and McGregor, 
Labor’s Senate leader, did not advance principles or evidence to justify 
the monopoly. Hughes did not refer to the monopoly at all. Pressed on 
the indirectly related question of double payment of royalties, he 
maintained in relation to sections 10 and 19 of the Bill, which together 
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could be read to impose the obligation, that “the law is quite clear”: 
double royalties were not applicable. 
McGregor hotly defended the necessity for carrying the import 
restrictions into Australian law. “A man,” he said, “might go to another 
country, purchase a copy [of a work] there, and bring it into the 
Commonwealth. It should be kept out, I say.” He railed against the idea 
of anyone obtaining copies of a work – albeit unpirated – from a 
foreign source without the owner’s authorisation:  
Suppose … the owner of a copyright in Canada assigned it to a person in New 
Zealand … If this amendment were carried, the person in New Zealand could send 
copies into Australia, where he should have no right to send them. We do not want 
any business of that description to eventuate in the Commonwealth. 
He begged his colleagues to support him in rejecting Vardon’s proposal 
to amend section 10 of the Bill25 to allow an Australian to import 
unpirated copies of works from Britain or its dominions.26 They 
obliged, rejecting the proposal by a majority of 13 votes, 18 noes to five 
ayes. Significantly, however, of the six senators who participated in the 
copyright debates of 1905, only two voted against the amendment and 
both were Government members.27 
British politicians and publishers might have predicted the Australian 
vote. British parliamentarians took the continuation of import controls 
for granted. During the copyright debates, no legislator bothered to 
speak a single word of justification for their existence, assuming no 
doubt that the dominions would continue to do their duty and uphold 
                                                     
25 Section 10(1) of the Bill read: “Copies made out of the Commonwealth of any 
work in which copyright subsists which if made in the Commonwealth would 
infringe copyright, and as to which the owner of copyright gives notice in writing 
by himself or his agent to the Comptroller-General of Customs, that he is desirous 
that such copies should not be imported into the Commonwealth, shall not be so 
imported and shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be deemed prohibited 
imports within the meaning of the Customs Act 1901–1910.”  
26 The proposed amendment, to be added to sub-section (6) of section 10, was to 
read: “This section shall have effect as the necessary modification of section 14 of 
the British Copyright Act but shall not apply to copies which have been purchased 
or made in some other part of His Majesty’s dominions to which this Act extends 
without infringement of the rights of the copyright there.”  
27 Keating, Lt Col Gould, Symon and Walker voted for the amendment; De Largie 
and Givens voted against. MacGregor was in the Senate in 1905 but did not 
participate in the copyright debates.  
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protocols favouring British exporters. The 18 senators who voted 
against Vardon’s amendment justified such confidence. 
Dissent of John Keating 
The shift in Australian thinking between 1905 and 1912 is striking. The 
men who passed Australia’s first Copyright Act refused to introduce a 
distribution monopoly, and rather than attack piracy by granting 
copyright owners the power to control the importation of works, chose 
to make the import of a pirated work an offence.28 The solution, as they 
saw it, lay not in distribution monopolies but a simple prohibition of 
dealings in pirated works. A person could import copies of a work from 
any source provided that the copies were legitimate. 
For the generation of 1912 the catchcry of uniformity swept away 
considerations of national interest. Governments of any political stripe 
usually deferred to imperial custom. Politicians in general seemed to 
consider the longevity of the import monopoly sufficient reason for 
continuance. They were opposed by a gallant few. Symon was silent, 
but Keating, the other giant of 1905, wasted no time in speaking out. 
Keating had no axe to grind. Despite his understandable pride in the 
1905 Act, he was not hostile to the copyright bill.  
He supported incorporation of the British legislation, and particularly 
welcomed the 50 year posthumous term and the mechanical rights. But 
he bitterly opposed import controls. Section 10, he called, “a big 
blackmailing clause”. A commanding man with a beguiling speaking 
voice – Robert Menzies described him after his death in 1940 as “one 
of the finest orators in Australia” – Keating tried his utmost to 
persuade his Senate colleagues. Speaking in October 1912, he stressed 
the inequity of applying to Australian conditions a rule designed for the 
benefit of British publishers.  
“We have to realise,” he said, “that copyright legislation affects not 
merely publishers, printers, and authors, but readers. It may be assumed 
in these days of universal education copyright legislation affects the 
whole community.” After inconclusive Committee discussion of 
Vardon’s proposed amendment to section 10, Keating adopted “a 
somewhat unusual course”. He made a final heartfelt appeal to the 
Government to reconsider its attitude: 
                                                     
28 Section 50 of the Copyright Act 1905.  
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I do not wish to re-open the discussion upon clause 10 or to take the highly unusual 
course of asking that the Bill should be recommitted for its further consideration, 
because I feel that the Vice-President of the Executive Council and his colleagues 
will realise their responsibility. I point out to the Vice-President of the Executive 
Council in all friendliness, the dangers that will beset the people of Australia if the 
Bill goes through in the form in which the Committee is about to report it to the 
Senate … In adopting this legislation we are adopting British legislation, and 
honourable senators must recognise that Great Britain is a totally different country 
from Australia. In adopting clause 10 … we are adopting a provision made in the 
United Kingdom to meet conditions with respect to importation of pirated copies, 
which are totally dissimilar from those which apply in Australia. 
Keating gave two examples of the interests which might be affected by 
the operation of section 10. The first concerned Australian importers of 
film, records, and moving pictures – “they might find that some 
individual in Australia claims to have bought the rights in those things 
and may hold them up at the Customs House. The provision will 
absolutely prevent such persons carrying on their ordinary business.” 
The second example related to a piece of music.  
If, for instance, a certain piece of music becomes a “craze” in London, what is to 
prevent an individual in Australia exploiting it by purchasing the rights for 
Australia from the owner of the copyright in England? He will buy only Australian 
rights. Then a firm carrying on legitimate business in Australia may cable an order 
to their London agents for 1,500 copies of the piece of music in question, and before 
they arrive a man walks into the Customs House, and says, “You cannot land 
these, because I have Australian rights.”  
Finally, Keating repeated his belief that section 10, unamended, would 
have sinister consequences:  
[S]ection 10, as it stands, affords [opportunity] for blackmail. I used that word by 
interjection when the matter was being discussed, and I did so advisedly. The clause 
opens to the door to blackmail, unless we insert a provision of the nature to which I 
have referred. 
His pleas, though, went unheeded. The Senate Committee greeted his 
arguments with silent indifference, as it had those of Senator Vardon, 
who warned that section 10, if enacted, would lead to the evils of 
monopoly: 
The result of that provision is to practically give a monopoly to a man who chooses to 
buy the copyright of a song, as far as Australia is concerned. Take, for example, the 
importer of 1000 copies of a popular song. When his consignment reaches 
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Australia, he may find that he can not get delivery through the Customs, and the 
song will be destroyed as a prohibited import. 
If some modification is not made to adapt the British Act to the Commonwealth, an 
opportunity will be offered to persons in the music trade to practically corner the sale 
of popular music here. 
Double royalty and national interest 
Patrick Glynn, Deakin’s Attorney General in the Fusion government of 
1909–10, construed the problem differently in the House of 
Representatives. He was concerned that the local owner of copyright 
could demand from a person importing records made under 
compulsory licence in Britain the same royalty paid already to the 
British copyright owner. Payment of the so-called “double royalty”, a 
concern both for British exporters and Australian importers, was a 
question of excise rather than import restriction.  
And though, at the official level, the British and Australians were 
unanimous in their opposition to double royalties, the debate over 
whether the purported obligation could be legitimately inferred from 
the legislation was to continue into 1913. Glynn mistakenly attributed 
the double royalty obligation to the section 10 distribution monopoly,29 
confusing the terms of debate. However, by directing the House’s 
attention to section 10, he inadvertently focused attention on the 
underlying issue that had been raised by Keating and Vardon – the 
effect of section 10 on the Australian national interest. 
The Labor MP, William Archibald, a follower of Gladstone, an 
enthusiast for the writings of Macaulay, and the man responsible for 
the establishment in South Australia of free libraries in corporate 
towns, broke ranks with the Government on section 10. He said that 
the Australian interest should be the only criterion for approving 
legislation. The worst aspect of failing to undo the double  
royalty obligation, he said, was that, “an injustice will be done to people 
in Australia.” 
In the same vein, he said: “I think this Parliament ought to be prepared 
to go to great lengths to protect Australians from being called upon to 
pay twice … the Bill is introduced to obtain uniform copyright law 
throughout the Empire, and I recognise that the object is most 
                                                     
29 It was the combination of copyright divisibility and British franking regulations 
that led to double royalties.  
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desirable, provided that we can secure it without inflicting any injustice 
on our own people.” 
The last speaker on the topic of section 10, David John Gordon, an 
active member of the Liberal Union executive, ignored fiscal 
considerations altogether and made a stirring declaration in favour of 
legislating in the national interest. He said, “we can easily imagine an 
Australian firm purchasing the copyright of a popular song or a set of 
films in England and under this clause securing a very large monopoly 
in Australia.” 
He said of section 10: 
The clause as drafted is all very well from the British aspect, but from the 
Australian stand-point it seems to me that we ought to consider the position of the 
people in this part of the world, and to modify the law to suit our own purposes 
rather than to suit those of persons who are copyrighting in Great Britain. For 
example, we can easily imagine an Australian firm purchasing the copyright of a 
popular song or a set of firms in England, and under this clause securing very large 
monopoly in Australia …  
I submit that we should legislate according to Australian requirements, rather than 
be content to accept the honourable gentleman’s [Attorney General Hughes’s] 
statement that the Bill has been drafted to bring us into line with the British 
copyright law, and that we cannot amend it in any way without breaking some 
agreement at which we have arrived at the Berlin Convention … 
I do no wish to see any piracy going on. I desire to insure to the author of a popular 
song the fruits of his own brain. At the same time, the Australian public ought to be 
protected to the extent of preventing any person here from having a monopoly and 
charging them just what he may choose, merely because he happens to have purchased 
that monopoly for a mere song on the other side of the world. 
Gordon, a former journalist, willingly challenged the orthodoxy of 
placing international unity before national self-interest. In the vanished 
spirit of 1905, he expressed a bold belief: that Australia’s national 
interest should be preferred to Britain’s. He perhaps implied something 
more, that imperial compacts and international agreements were not 
sacred covenants. Archibald, the Labor renegade, immediately 
supported his sentiments, declaring that politicians “should not make 
away with our rights for the sake of securing uniformity.” 
The Government listened to Gordon in polite silence, then ignored 
him. Like Vardon and Keating, he spoke in vain. Australia adopted 
import controls designed for the benefit of British copyright owners 
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and enforced rules that would allow copyright owners to control 
supply, and fix prices, for the rest of the century.  
Publishers and the colonies 
Before the new legislation, British publishers were much attached to 
the rights granted to them under section XVII of the 1842 Copyright 
Act. As owners of the copyright in books, they alone could import into 
any British possession any book for sale or hire. The import monopoly 
increased the price of books imported into the colonies (and later the 
self-governing dominions) and increased the publishers’ profits. 
Ostensibly, the monopoly prevented piracy of books by enabling the 
copyright owner to ensure only legitimate copies of books were 
supplied. In fact, it prevented colonial importers from obtaining books 
from British wholesalers or retailer at prices lower than those charged 
by the publishers.  
Although colonial markets provided rich pickings for British publishers, 
the publishers did not look kindly on the colonials who added to their 
profits. In evidence to the Gorrell Committee, John Murray spoke of 
the “difficulty which has for many years been experienced with the self-
governing colonies with regard to copyright legislation”. In 1911,  
prior to introduction of the Copyright Bill, William Heinemann 
observed, with apparent distaste, “a growing feeling in the colonies  
that the enjoyment of copyright should be granted only against a 
substantial quid pro quo and that it should be limited – in the interest 
of democracy.” 
C J Longman, contemplating section 26(1) of the 1911 Act, which 
permitted self-governing dominions to repeal imperial copyright 
legislation, noted mournfully in a letter to The Times that “the time has 
arrived when full power to legislate on copyright must be given to the 
self-governing Dominions.” But, said Longman, they must not be 
allowed to disadvantage British interests: it was the duty of the  
British polity to consider “how to obtain from the Dominions the best 
terms for British authors and artists”. He, for one, had no doubt that 
grave danger was looming. The dominions might adopt a 
manufacturing requirement similar to the reviled obligation in force in 
the United States.  
To secure copyright, British publishers would have to go to the expense 
of printing in the offending dominion and if they failed to do so, 
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domestic pirates could publish unauthorised editions of British works 
and secure local copyright: 
What the adoption of a manufacturing clause by each and all of our Dominions 
against the Mother Country would mean is known to many and need not be 
enlarged on here. Mr Buxton does not think there is any fear of its occurring.  
Many persons, however, believe that sooner or later it is certain to occur, and 
probably sooner. 
In correspondence to The Times, John Murray raised the same prospect, 
alluding to the manufacturing provisions in the new Canadian 
Copyright Bill and the Australian Act of 1905. The Sydney Morning 
Herald, however, rejected as “unfounded” his prediction that the 
provisions, if enforced, would prove “disastrous to British authors”. 
The paper pointed out that dominion legislation could not exclude an 
imperial statute, and the British Copyright Act of 1842 gave the British 
copyright-holder protection in all British possessions. Moreover, the 
Australian Act stipulated that to satisfy the manufacturing requirement 
the British owner need only supply proof of title.  
The attitude of British publishers towards Australia stemmed from the 
ancient mercantilist practices of their trade. Although free trade 
proponents attacked the waste and inefficiency of the imperial trade 
system, few exporters were going to advocate that captive imperial 
markets be freed from laws nicely calculated to increase the margins of 
British businesses. 
With the growth of the Empire, publishers and government combined 
to create a legislative vice for the colonies that prevented countries such 
as Australia from importing British books, sheet music and fine art 
prints from any source other than the copyright owner. Yet the effects 
of the monopoly aroused little protest. Even opponents of the 
monopoly, when they considered how it worked in practice, 
concentrated on the activities of Australian opportunists, not British 
vested interest. David Gordon, for instance, criticised the monopoly as 
detrimental to public interest, but he saw the harm coming mostly from 
sharp-eyed locals exploiting s10(1) to establish a monopoly in the 
distribution of English hit records. 
It did not seem to occur to him – and certainly not to proponents of 
controls – that the foreign producers of records and books might 
choose to keep the local rights, or assign them to an Australian 
subsidiary, and thereby retain the monopoly. In any event, the practice 
of the British publishing houses provided a long-standing example of 
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monopoly upheld by imperial legislation to the detriment of local 
interests. In 1912, Australian legislators, seemingly oblivious to that 
example, sought unity in preference to attacking monopoly, and 
disadvantaged future generations of Australians.  
The Copyright Act 1912 
The Copyright Act 1912, which applied for 56 years until the passing of 
new legislation in 1968, suffers by comparison with the Act it replaced. 
The Act of 1905 is a model of clear organisation and concise prose but, 
more importantly, it truly reflected the aims of Australian legislators 
looking to the Australian interest. The Act of 1912 incorporated British 
legislation drafted from the British perspective. Adopted in Australia 
because of perceived necessity, the British Act created norms that 
reflected international agreement. 
The new legislation abandoned the old formula for the copyright term, 
dating back to the 1842 imperial Act, introduced a generic class of 
‘works’ (meaning that the traditional category of ‘Books’ disappeared 
from the statute books) and the compulsory licensing of literary and 
musical works. It enlarged the scope of copyright to include production 
or reproduction in any material form whatsoever, including the right to 
make a record or cinematograph film. 
At the same time, the 1912 Act abandoned the 1905 prohibition against 
importing of pirated copies of books or artistic works in favour of an 
import clause that allowed the owner of a work to prevent the 
importation of even legitimate copies of the work. The class of 
copyright infringements expanded to include a list of civil offences and 
the set of summary remedies similarly grew. In conventional  
copyright narratives, an accretion of new rights and remedies is usually 
described as “modernisation” or “updating” of legislation, but the 
uneasy accommodation of foreign legislation in the “modernisation” of 
the Australian legislation meant the 1912 Act, if modernised, also 
seemed unbalanced. 
The Act was divided into two parts. The first, drafted in Australia, 
constituted the Act proper and was divided into five parts that dealt in 
turn with preliminaries, incorporation of the British Act and 
interpretation of the Act to adapt it to Australian conditions, import 
controls, summary remedies, the Copyright Office, and miscellaneous 
matters (primarily concerned with statutory deposit). The second  
part formed the Schedule to the Act and comprised the British Act.  
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It was the Schedule that provided the substance of Australia’s copyright 
law until 1968. Part I was headed ‘Imperial Copyright’ and set out  
the rights, remedies, obligations and application of copyright.  
Part II, ‘International Copyright’, concerned Orders in Council 
extending the provisions of the Act to foreign [i.e. non-imperial] works 
and British possessions other than the Dominions. Part III, 
‘Supplemental Provisions’, comprised certain saving provisions and the 
interpretation section. 
As to rights, copyright subsisted, throughout the Empire, in works 
published anywhere within the Empire.30 Copyright meant “the sole 
right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof 
in any material form whatsoever, to perform, or in the case of a lecture 
to deliver, the work or any substantial part thereof.”31 It included the 
rights of translation, conversion from one type of work to another, 
performance of a converted work, and the making or records, 
perforated rolls, cinematograph films, “or other contrivance by means 
of which the work may be mechanically performed and delivered, and 
to authorize any such acts as aforesaid.”32 Copyright was divisible.33 
Infringement occurred if a person “without the consent of the owner 
of the copyright, does anything the sole right to do which is by this Act 
conferred on the owner of the copyright.”34 It was an infringement  
to deal in copyright works, or to import works to any part of the  
Empire to which the Act applied, for commercial purposes and  
without authorisation.35 
Infringement did not occur in the case of “fair dealing with any work 
for the purpose of private study, research, criticism, review or 
newspaper summary”;36 the re-use by an artist of materials used to 
produce a commissioned work, so long as the main design of the work 
was not repeated or imitated; the making of artistic works which 
reproduced sculptures or works of artistic craftsmanship located in a 
public place, or architectural works of art; the publication for schools 
of collections of mostly non-copyright matter containing short passages 
                                                     
30 Copyright Act 1912 (No 20 of 1912), Schedule, section 1(1)(a).  
31 Section 1(2).  
32 Section 1(2)(d).  
33 Section 5(2): ‘The owner of the copyright in any work may assign the right, either 
wholly or partially …’  
34 Section 2(1).  
35 Section 2(2).  
36 Section 2(1)(i).  
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from published literary works; the publication in a newspaper of a 
public lecture; and the public reading or recitation of a reasonable 
extract from a published work.37 
The term of copyright subsisted for the life of the author and a period 
of 50 years after the author’s death.38 The Act permitted a person, 25 
years after the author’s death, by giving a prescribed notice, to 
reproduce the work for sale, providing that royalties of 10 per cent of 
the sale price of each copy sold were paid to the owner. In addition, 
following an author’s death, a person could apply to the Privy Council 
for a licence to reproduce a work that the owner was allegedly 
withholding from the public.39 The author could assign copyright in a 
work for a period of 25 years only, at which time the copyright reverted 
to the author’s estate.40 
In actions for infringement, the Act conferred on the owner the right 
to obtain an injunction or interdict, damages, accounts and the recovery 
of infringing material.41 Summary remedies consisted of fines of 40 
shillings for each copy of a work made, without authorisation, for 
commercial purposes (up to a maximum sum of £50), fines of £50  
for possession of plates for the production of infringing copies,  
or for allowing a work to be publicly performed for profit, and the 
destruction of plates or infringing copies or their delivery to the owner 
of the work infringed.42 
The Act established a separate copyright “records, perforated rolls, and 
other contrivances by means of which sounds may be reproduced, in 
like manner as if such contrivances were musical works”. Copyright 
lasted 50 years from “the making of the original plate from which the 
contrivance was directly or indirectly derived”. Once a work was 
recorded, any person could make new recordings of the work provided 
a royalty was paid to the owner at the following rates: 2.5 per cent of 
the sale price of each record sold, if the recording was made within  
two years of the commencement of the Act, and thereafter at a rate of  
5 per cent. 
                                                     
37 Section 2(1)(ii)–(vi).  
38 Section 3.  
39 Section 4.  
40 Section 5(2).  
41 Section 6(1)–(3).  
42 Section 11(1)–(13).  
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Copyright in photographs lasted for 50 years from the making of the 
original negative43 and ‘photographs’ (separately defined as including 
“photolithograph and any work produced by a process analogous to 
photography”) were included within the definition of ‘artistic work’.44 
The Act placed ‘Cinematograph’ (defined as including “any work 
produced by any process analogous to cinematography”) in the 
definition of ‘dramatic work’, or rather, “any cinematograph production 
where the arrangement or acting form or the combination of incidents 
give the work an original character”. 
 
                                                     
43 Section 21.  
44 Section 35(1).  
